Egypt, home to one of the great ancient
civilizations recognized in Western historiography, has once again become a
center of world attention. Following the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings which
toppled long-time ruler Hosni Mubarek, various forces of Egyptian society have
emerged in an ongoing contest over social and political power. Of these forces,
one of the most prominent has been that of organized Islam, particularly the
Muslim Brotherhood. How did Islam come to Egypt and how has it manifested
itself in modern organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood? What has been its
role in Egypt since independence, and what role will political Islam and the
Muslim Brotherhood likely play in the future?
Background History
Dynastic rule of the Egyptian pharaohs came
to an end in 341 BCE following the invasion of the Zoroastrian Persian empire.
The Nile river valley was subsequently brought under the rule of the Greeks,
Romans, and Byzantines over the next centuries. Islam and Arabic were brought
to the region during the seventh century, and the area was controlled by
Muslims for more than 1,000 years afterwards.
Like much of the world, the region which
now includes Egypt was eventually subsumed under the rule of European colonialism.
Whereas France’s attempt to establish a colony lasted less than three years
between 1798-1801, the British Empire established stable control over the
territory, notably the Suez Canal, in 1882.
Throughout world, the beginning of the
recent era was marked by the end of WWII and the rise of decolonization
movements in the Third World. For Egypt, recent history begins in 1952, when
the Free Officers Movement carried out a military coup d’etat, ending British
occupation and the comprador Ali monarchy. Following the ascent to power by
Gamal Nasser and over the next decades, the newly independent country began to
pursue secular nationalist domestic policies oriented towards industrial
development, social reforms, and welfare. Egypt under Nasser also pursued a
foreign policy which gravitated towards the Soviet Union, the Non-Aligned
Movement and Pan-Arabism. Nasser, an early Arab Muslim leader in the
decolonization movement, was an influence for later figures such as Muammar
Qaddafi, Ahmed Ben Bella, and George Habash.
Whereas the policies pursued by the newly
independent Egypt were positive in regards to areas like land reform, welfare
programs, the extension of women’s rights, and its international vision, the
method of governance was overall undemocratic (though not illegitimate).
The post-revolutionary Egyptian government suppressed dissent from both the
left and right. Both religious and secular organizations were barred from
formally participating in politics, and a system of one-party rule with little
representation was instituted as part of the 1956 constitution. Various
populist reforms and anti-imperialist measures gained the Nasser-led government
a degree of legitimacy and aided in tempering serious internal opposition.
Nevertheless the limits of the ‘post-colonial’ political and economic model
which Egypt pursued began to be felt at the same time the global
counter-offensive by capital, known today as neo-liberal globalization, got
underway.
A major turning point in Egyptian history
occurred in 1970, the year Nasser died and Anwar El-Sadat became the new
president. Sadat ushered in a policy of ‘de-Nasserization’ and opened the
doors of Egypt’s economy to western finance capital. Though Egypt’s
economy succumbed to liberalization in the early 1970′s, its political system did not. One of
Sadat’s first political accomplishments after assuming power was to purge
Nasser supporters, and other critics of his ‘reforms,’ from the political
landscape. Additionally, as these new policies further alienated the
Egyptian people from the state and heightened social tensions, the Sadat-led
regime began to cultivate support from those on the Islamic right.
Political Islam in Post-Nasser Egypt
For nationalists such as Nasser, the Soviet
Union offered a model of economic and state development which paralleled the
perceived needs and desires of Egyptian society and its political leadership.
Like other leaders and countries associated with the Bandung era, the goal was
not to become part of the Soviet Union’s orbit, but to accomplish a similar
degree of political self-determination, economic development, and social
welfare. The construction of a strong secular state was a means of securing
such economic and social ends. However, the construction of such a state also
required a limited amount of democratic political practice. Nasser’s doctrine
of ‘Arab socialism’ consciously denied the role of class struggle, and amounted
to a series of programs and situational demands of Egypt’s revolutionary
nationalist leadership. Thus, civil society was allowed a limited
political role, and repression was carried out against those who were critical
of the regime.
While Nasser tried to suppress the Muslim
Brotherhood outright, Sadat cultivated support from the Islamic right after he
abandoned many of the Nasser-era programs. At the same time Sadat’s
rapprochement with the West and Israel coincided with his rapprochement and
tolerance of reactionary Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood.
Though the Brotherhood was barred from formal politics, it was allowed room to
dominate other aspects of life, from religion and education to social
services and law. While Sadat’s policies ruined the education and public
service programs created under Nasser, the Muslim Brotherhood was later able to
insert itself precisely in these areas, thus increasing its influence in public
life. Under Sadat’s neo-liberal economic and foreign policy reforms, inroads of
informal social power were created for Islamists, Sharia law again gained a
place in public life, and centuries-old oppression of women and religious
minorities began to resurface in Egyptian society. As part of the offense of
western capital beginning in the 1970′s, neo-liberal ‘de-Nasserization’ also marked the beginning of the
re-Islamization of Egyptian society.
Sadat’s tolerance and implicit promotion of
the Muslim Brotherhood eventually led to his assassination by its members in
1981 following the his signing of the Camp David Accords. It also founded the
situation which would last throughout the rule of Hosni Mubarek until the Arab
Spring movement.
Writing at the onset of the protests in
Eygpt, journalist Kenan Malik noted the continuing reactionary role of the
Muslim Brotherhood:
“After Sadat’s assassination, Hosni Mubarak
took over as Egypt’s strongman. During his 30-year-long brutal rule, there have
been deep tensions between secular and religious authorities, tensions that
have often broken out into open conflict. But there has also been recognition
by both sides of their mutual dependence. The Egyptian government has
needed not just a police state but also a viable Islamist opposition to keep
secular radicals in check. The Muslim Brotherhood is officially banned, but in
practice tolerated. Its candidates are allowed to stand in elections as
independents and now form the largest opposition group in parliament. The
Islamists, in turn, have used the repressive policies of the government to
promote themselves as the only legitimate oppositional voice. But they,
as much as the government, despise and fear popular power and democratic
institutions.
“The cynicism of secular politicians in
Muslim countries has been matched only by the cynicism of western policy.
Western governments have been concerned primarily not with promoting freedom
but with maintaining stability. Where Islamists have threatened that
stability, or challenged western interests, then western governments have been
happy to see them brutally suppressed, even when they have came to power through
the ballot box, as happened in Algeria in 1991. But where fundamentalists
have played a useful part in maintaining social order, or establishing western
benefit, then the west has been happy to support them, from jihadis in
Afghanistan in the 1980s to the Saudi regime today.
“The crushing of radical secular movements
is one of the reasons that in recent years opposition protests in Egypt have
been led mainly by the Muslim Brotherhood. What makes the current
protests so different is that ordinary secular voices, repressed for so long by
both religious and secular authorities, have finally broken out.”
The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt
Today
Speaking on the recent uprising,
Egyptian-born economist Samir Amin contends that the division in the Muslim
world should not be considered as between Islamists and secularists, but
between “reactionaries and progressives.”
The Muslim Brotherhood opposed the
anti-Mubarek protests initially. On the fourth day, as the movement was
clearly and quickly gaining steam, the Muslim Brotherhood encouraged its
members to join street demonstrations. Following two more weeks of
widespread civil unrest and violence, Mubarek was removed by a military junta
on February 11th.
There is strong indication that Islam will
gain influence in the future of Egyptian politics and take over part of the
role formerly played by Mubarek’s secular rule. During the country’s
first parliamentary election since Mubarek’s departure from the political
scene, the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party,
took 40% of the seats, followed by the Salafi (ultra-conservative) Nour
Party. First rounds of presidential elections are scheduled to take place
on May 23 and 24th.
But the Muslim Brotherhood and reactionary
Islam are not the only forces acting to influence Egyptian society. According
to Amin, youth, along with middle class democrats and the radical left, were
also significant actors in the movement against Mubarek.
Describing these youth in an interview at
the time of the uprising, Amin noted,
“They are politicised young people, they
are organised very strongly, they are more than one million organised, which is
not at all a small number. They are against the social and economic
system. Whether they are anti-capitalist is a little theoretical for
them, but they are against social injustice and growing inequality. They
are nationalist in the good sense, they are anti-imperialist. They hate
the submission of Egypt to the US hegemony. They are therefore against
so-called peace with Israel, which tolerates Israel’s continued colonisation of
occupied Palestine. They are democratic, totally against the dictatorship
of the army and the police.”
Yet the question remains, will democratic
anti-imperialist visions prevail, or will the neo-liberal state reconstituted
with Islamic leadership become Egypt’s new dictatorship? In a more recent
interview, Amin indicated that the Arab Spring “has been neither successful nor
defeated.” Instead for Amin, the Arab Spring represents a potential positive
step for the region and a possible advance for the left. As well, what we are
today witnessing may only be “the start of a wider movement.”
It will take more than protest movements,
demands for reform, election campaigns, and single-issue organizing to truly
remake Egyptian society in a positive manner. Real progressive change will come
as the people of Egypt, its workers, women, progressive democrats, radicals,
and inspired youth, organize for their own social, economic and political
empowerment: something which can only come at the expense and ultimately
through the overthrow of the extant reactionary state and the western powers
behind it.
For the Muslim Brotherhood, the Arab Spring
and fall of Mubarek will offer a significant opportunity to entrench itself in
the power of that reactionary state. Once tolerated as a better of possible
oppositions by a repressive secular government, Islamists may emerge as key
surrogates for capital and western powers in maintaining the larger order.
Acting alongside the Egyptian military establishment and international allies
such as the United States and Israel, reactionary Islamists, if not checked
through progressive class struggle, will likely become a prominent oppressive
force in Egyptian social and political life.
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